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Norway represents one of the last countries in Europe where the structural development of agriculture is
strongly state regulated through legislation and economic instruments. The result is an agriculture
dominated by very small farms while, in most of the rest of Europe, farming has been rationalised into
much larger units e thus improving the structural efﬁciency of agriculture. This study looks at how and
why the pattern of farmland control (ownership and renting) in Norway has changed over the last ﬁfty
years. Using a study of agricultural policy documents, an investigation of statistics on farmland control
changes, and a qualitative survey, we explore the considerable growth in the number of partly rented
farms over this period. We suggest that change is attributable to three key factors: techno-economic
development leading to a growing need for economies of scale, social norms curbing the transfer of
farm properties outside of the family, and policy and legal instruments reducing the extent of property
transfer. In addition, the weakening of compensation to smaller farmers since the 1990s has encouraged
many to leave agriculture and made more rental land available e ultimately leading to a rapid shift from
traditional owner occupation to a predominantly rented land system.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.1. Introduction
The nature of agriculture is changing. Within the European
Union, for example, multifunctional policies are encouraging the
development of a diversiﬁed agricultural sector while, on the other
hand, the forces of “market productivism” are restructuring agri-
culture in favour of larger, more commercialised and specialised
businesses (Potter and Tilzey, 2007). Norway, a country outside the
EU but strongly inﬂuenced by EU policy approaches, is now expe-
riencing similar structural change. In 1959 there were 198,315
agricultural holdings in Norway with 87 percent of the properties
wholly owned by the farmer operator (Statistics Norway, 2002).
Half a century later the total number of agricultural holdings hasþ47 73 59 12 75.
nar.forbord@bygdeforskning.
stry properties in Norway. Of
e farmland was rented out or
occupied agricultural activity
somewhat smaller than the
lture and Forestry (46,624) is
Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SAfallen to 46,624 (Statistics Norway, 2011b), while the number of
agricultural properties has remained relatively stable.1 These
changes can be attributed to two main factors: ﬁrstly, working
farms have increased in size over the last 50 years and, secondly,
there has been a dramatic change in the way farmland is controlled
e a shift from owner occupation to renting such that, by 2008,
farmers in Norway were on average leasing 40 percent of their land
(Landbruks- og matdepartementet, 2011-2012).
This represents an important shift in Norwegian agriculture.
Historically, agriculture in Norway was based on a post-WWII
“social contract” between the government and the then largely
rural Norwegian population (Almås, 2004), which placed emphasis
on productivity, self-sufﬁciency, efﬁciency and maintaining an
average farming income comparable to that of urban workers e as
well as contributing to rural employment and rural settlement
(Rønningen et al., 2012). Later, ensuring a viable agriculture and
living cultural landscapes throughout the country became an
important objective. However, as Bjørkhaug and Richards (2008)
point out, even though Norway is “situated toward a ‘strong’ end
of a continuum of a level of multifunctional agriculture” (see
Wilson, 2008), this multifunctionality is based ﬁrmly on active
farming. Only farmers on the production register qualify for sub-
sidies for the provision of public goods such as biodiversity, cultural
landscapes, viable rural communities and so forth (Ministry of
Agriculture and Food, 2006). license.
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economically viable to maintain the many relatively small farms
across the country. Low proﬁtability and long hours combined with
a strong urban labour market have meant that payments for pro-
duction have not been sufﬁcient to stem a steady decline in the
number of active farms.
In this paper, we seek to explore changes in farmland control as
part of the general development of agriculture in Norway over the
last half century. In particular, we detail legal and economic in-
struments that have guided Norwegian agriculture and assess how
they, together with other factors, have contributed to the observed
changes. The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we review
changes in property relations in Europe and the importance of
farmland control. Second, we present a methodology for the
investigation of the issue. Third, we present the results in three
parts: a description of agricultural policy with a speciﬁc focus on
legal and economic instruments, an analysis of public statistics on
farmland control, and a qualitative survey of farmers. Finally, we
discuss the results and propose a model of farmland control before
concluding on the likely future for land control in Norway.
2. Farmland control e changes in property relations in
Europe
There are two key dimensions to control over farmland. The ﬁrst
dimension concerns how the control is exerted, that is through
formal or informal means. Formal control exists through legisla-
ture, regulatory agencies and courts, whereas informal control
takes place mainly in families, communities and associations. The
second dimension regards the type of governance. In principal,
farmland can be controlled through spontaneous as well as inten-
tional forms of economic governance (Williamson, 1996). Sponta-
neous governance corresponds to the classical market e the
“invisible hand” (Smith, 1991 [1776]). Intentional governance refers
to conscious, purposeful governance, of which agreement and
ownership are two forms. In practice, the long-term nature of
agricultural production has meant that intentional governance
through agreement and ownership have been themost widely used
ways to control farmland (Geisler and Salamon, 1993).
Why is this important? From a structural perspective, the control
dimensions noted above have different consequences for farming
systems in terms of incentives, adaptability, legislation and bureau-
cratic costs (Williamson, 1996). However, they are also important
from a social perspective. Brown (2007) for example, notes that the
nature of property and land control matters because of the role it
plays in determining howpeople can engagewith land, in particular,
who can access speciﬁc parts of land and how they are able to use it.
Thus land tenure, in a sense, governs the relationship between
people and the environment by setting restrictions and rights on our
physical interaction and consequently deﬁning permissible cultural
engagement. This relationship is reciprocal. Changes in society can
also alter our needs for land governance such that institutional
structures that functioned in the pastmay cease to adequately reﬂect
the changing requirements of the population (Blomley, 2005).
One of the key drivers of change in farmland control in Norway
is the liberalisation of economic and political governance (e.g.
Potter and Tilzey, 2005; Potter and Tilzey, 2007). While neoliberal
reforms involve multiple changes, those relevant to the relation-
ship between people and agricultural land are largely concerned
with the reduction in state regulation, promotion of individual
choice, enforcement of private property rights and increased
emphasis on market based solutions (see Peck and Tickell (2002),
for a critical overview). These tendencies have been apparent in
agricultural policy since the 1990s, but the result so far is far from
complete liberalisation. There are both strong elements of socialdemocracy and rights remaining (e.g. allodial law) and sectorally
based differences in the level of adherence to market principles. In
terms of land use change in Europe, the inﬂuence of neoliberalism
is evident in the loosening of government regulation but, more
generally, in farmers’ increasing need to rely on market forces
rather than government ﬁnancial support. In this context, as Evans
(2009) observes, “renting land is clearly a quick and convenient
way of increasing the size of the farm business and responding to
market and/or policy signals”.
However, the increased ﬂexibility associated with market re-
forms and globalization has also been argued to create greater need
for security of identity within an increasingly uncertain society
(Beck, 1992). As a result, land control is being governed by two
competing forces e one pushing ﬂexibility of land use as a market
resource and the other leading farming families to seek security of
identity. As market forces push some (many) farms out of business
as economic units, so the desire tomaintain family identity compels
historically farming families to hold on to farmland, with the
consequent development of land rental markets (while maintain-
ing control over the resource) providing a solution to both issues.
These shifting patterns of ownership/rental land control can be
seen as part of a long history of land ownership change in Europe
(Kloppenburg and Geisler, 1985; Munton, 2009). Prior to c1900 this
relationship was heavily in favour of the land owner (Gjerdåker,
2002; Lunden, 2002) with ownership holding connotations of po-
wer, status, self-determination and even the democratization of
society. In this era the self-sufﬁcient farmer owning and controlling
his/her own farmland became a powerful political ideal in both the
United States (Gasson and Errington, 1993; Wunderlich, 1993) and
European countries such as Norway (Gjerdåker, 2002; Lunden,
2002). As a result, widespread legislation was introduced leading
to a signiﬁcant reduction in the proportion of land under rental
agreements in many countries e for example, England (Gasson and
Errington, 1993), the US (Kloppenburg and Geisler, 1985), and
Norway (Gjerdåker, 2002).
In recent decades we have seen a return to the trend of leasing
land for agricultural production (Dramstad and Sang, 2010;Munton,
2009;Wunderlich,1993). However, rather than the simple landlord/
tenant exchanges of the past, these arrangements are becoming
increasingly complex. As Hodge (2009) observes, even the hybrid
categories of land ownership such as “part-owner-operatorship”
(Kloppenburg and Geisler, 1985) and “mixed tenure farmers” (Hill
and Gasson, 1985) are often no longer sufﬁcient to describe land/
resource control as farmbusinesses gain access to land and resources
by a wide variety of arrangements (Evans, 2009; Ward et al., 1990).
Moreover, Ravenscroft (1999) found that a ‘neo-feudal’ lease system
where there is a balance between owner and leaser underpinned by
government is amore stable andﬂexiblewayof controlling farmland
than ‘extreme’ systems where either the owner is the dominant
(‘feudal’ systems) or the leaser is the most powerful (‘post-feudal’
systems). Further, he contends that notions of a linear historical
progression from feudalism to post-feudalism should be rejected.
At the moment, land leasing seems to be becoming an
increasingly important means of developing the required econo-
mies of scale for modern agriculture. For example, Smithers and
Johnson (2004) observed that farmers were using tenancy to
enlarge the scale of their operation as part of an “assisted growth”
strategy. Valbuena et al. (2008) identiﬁed a group of young well
educated farmers on already relatively large farms (“expansionist
diversiﬁers”) who were seeking to increase both income from non-
agricultural sources and agricultural production scales. In another
case, Maye et al. (2009) in a study of 390 tenant farmers in the UK
observed that, whereas only 18.5 percent of farmers were renting
from landed estates, 20 percent of tenant farmers in their survey
were renting from 3 or more private landlords. Recent research in
Fig. 1. Map showing municipalities and regions where farmers were interviewed.
2 Luster represents the less favoured areas in Norway.
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corporations or landed estatesmore difﬁcult than renting land from
smaller private owners as “they were often not so concerned about
obtaining a fully commercial return from the land” and often, as
they lived locally, could adequately understand the circumstances
and requirements of the renter (Ilbery et al., 2010).
The issue of changing land control in Norway has been the
subject of very little recent research. Yet, as we note above, the role
of land tenure in governing the relationship between people and
the environment is a critical one - making it important to under-
stand how land control is changing in Norwegian agriculture. In
particular, the dramatic changes in the number of active farms over
the last decade suggest signiﬁcant changes are occurring and it is
these that are the focus of our investigation.
3. Methodology
The study builds on qualitative and quantitative data drawn
from three sources. First, to describe relevant factors and changes
we conducted a document analysis of Norway’s agricultural policy
development. This is supplemented by information available on the
internet including law texts, protocols from the annual agricultural
negotiations (“Jordbruksforhandlingene”, available on www.
regjeringen.no/nb/dep/lmd), directives on regulations, and guides
to subsidy schemes. Second, in order to explore changes in farm-
land control in Norway we obtained statistical data (both publically
available and on request) from Statistics Norway. These data were
then processed by the authors to, for example, produce time series
and calculate relative proportions within variables.
Third, in order to better understand farmers’ perspectives and
arguments, interviews were conducted with 18 farmers in three
agricultural regions in Norway: Eastern Norway, Jæren, and West-
ern Norway. These regions were chosen for the contrasting nature
of their agriculture e from the important cereal growing area of
Eastern Norway to intensive livestock production in Jæren and,
ﬁnally, extensive livestock systems (on common grazings) withsome fruit and berry production in Western Norway. This reﬂects a
basic division in Norwegian agriculture between conditions highly
favourable for agriculture in Jæren and other lowland areas
(Eastern Norway and Trøndelag) and the unfavourable conditions
prevalent in the rest of the country. While the interview data are
over-representative of Norway’s better agricultural land these are
the areas where agriculture is focused (and is likely to continue) in
Norway. From the three regions (see map in Fig. 1) we recruited six
farmers from each of the regionally ‘typical’ municipalities of
Trøgstad, Time and Luster.2
Interviewees were selected with the assistance of local agri-
cultural authorities. The researchers made a written request to the
farmers combined with a brief preliminary questionnaire con-
cerning features of the farm/farm family to ensure that the sample
included farms in a variety of relevant situations. The local agri-
cultural authorities then sent the request to 40 farmers/farm
owners with an invitation to complete the questionnaire. On
average the response rate was 50 percent. Among respondents
willing to be interviewed we selected six farmers/farm owners in
each municipality. In particular, as the study was focused on
farmland control and structural issues, we ensured that the sample
contained representatives from the farmland control categories of
interest, see Table 1 below, namely: “wholly owned”, “mainly
owned” and “mainly rented” as well as the category of non-farming
owner (“rented out”). We received no responses in the category
“wholly rented” and, owing to the difﬁculties recruiting farmers in
this category and their relatively small number, made no additional
efforts to recruit respondents from this category.
Interviews involved personal visits to the farms. Where couples
were farming we encouraged both parties to take part in the inter-
view, resulting in 8 interviews with farming couples and 10 with
individual farmers. The interviews were semi-structured and based
on an interview guide covering various relevant topics including
structural change in agriculture and the history, development, ac-
tivity, ownership, and leasing of farmland in the farm holding. In-
terviews were carried out between May 2011 and September 2012
and lasted between 1 and 1.5 h. All interviews were recorded and
fully transcribed. The interview transcripts were coded in NVivo and
analysed using a cross-sectional code and retrieve approach.
Hence, the approach we employed involved data triangulation
of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). The purpose was not
necessarily to obtain data that converged on the same set of facts or
ﬁndings but to obtain a comprehensive illumination of the phe-
nomenon (Bryman, 2004). Although some may raise the issue of
representativeness and/or reliability of conclusions drawn from 18
interviews it should be remembered that we were not hypothesis
testing (where quantitative approaches and larger surveys are
required) but exploring how the issues that emerged from the
document and statistical analyses were being framed by the
farmers themselves. While additional perspectives could have been
revealed from further interviews (in particular interviews with
farmers from other regions), the size of the sample was constrained
by resource limitations. In addition, interviews revealed a relatively
consistent set of responses across respondents regardless of region
e reﬂecting the national implementation of the key policies and
legislation inﬂuencing land tenure systems as well as social and
structural similarities across the country.
4. Results
This section is divided into three sub-sections. The ﬁrst provides
a brief overview of agricultural policy in Norway in the post-WWII
3 The objective of controlling the price is to ensure that the property remains
proﬁtable for agricultural purposes.
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economic instruments. This is followed by an analysis of Norwegian
statistics that explores changes in the control of farmland from
1959 to the present. Finally, the third sub-section explores the
drivers and motivators of change from land owner and farmer
perspectives through an analysis of the interviews.
4.1. Agricultural policy in Norway and legal and economic
instruments
Agricultural policy has a major impact on the control of farm-
land (Ravenscroft, 1999). In Norway the structure of farming (e.g.
size distribution of farms, ownership forms) has been a policy
concern during the entire post-WWII period with both legal and
economic instruments being applied to obtain policy goals. These
two instrument types affect different areas of agricultural land
control. Legal instruments impact directly on land ownership and
transfer of land rights through state control. In contrast, economic
instruments tend to guide the way in which the land is used (what
is produced and how) and inﬂuence changes in farmland control by
determining which land use options are economically desirable
(Sevatdal and Sky, 2003). For example, subsidy schemes can be
designed to support farms of a certain size (generally small farms in
the EU) while deterring others.
Although compensation payments were focused on smaller
farmers, until the early 1970s the main emphasis in Norway was
neverthelesse as in other parts of Europe (Wilson, 2001, 2008)e on
increasing the efﬁciency of agriculture (Sagelvmo, 2000). The
annual agricultural negotiations between the state and farmers’
organisations had been introduced in 1950 to ensure that farmers
received a liveable income from the sale of agricultural produce
while also stimulating efﬁciency improvements through adoption
of new technology and adjustments in the production structure.
This objective was enshrined in legislation through the 1955 Agri-
cultural Act. This act highlighted the role of the state in providing
agricultural land to people who wanted to own and operate farms
that were big enough to provide income for a family (Almås, 2002).
A new provision introduced in the law to obtain this goal was the
prohibition of partitioning of farm properties unless approved by
the state. In 1958 the agricultural agreement formalised price- and
market-arrangements with state guaranteed prices for the pro-
duction of grain and milk. The state also subsidised the cost of such
input factors as feed concentrates and fertilizers.
The 1970s witnessed a shift in agricultural policy in Norway
towards an increasing emphasis on food self-sufﬁciency and
farmers’ welfare and incomes (Almås, 1994). As well as lowering
production efﬁciency goals, these changes sought to equalise in-
come across farms of different sizes and to support welfare through
payments such as the provision for holiday relief. A newAllodial Act
was legislated in 1974 giving men and women equal rights when
taking over farms. The new Concession Act adopted the same year
introduced the provisions of “boplikt” (obligation of residency) and
“driveplikt” (obligation of farming) for farmers. The aim was to
secure active farmers. In addition the new law illustrated how
maintaining population in rural areas had become a key goal in
agricultural policy.
While maintaining rural population has remained important in
agricultural policy, the social welfare dimension lost support during
the 1980s as it appeared to be contributing to overproduction. It was
replaced by a new policy in the 1990s emphasising deregulation and
market orientation (Almås, 1994; Landbruksdepartementet, 1992-
93) and “robust agriculture” became the new slogan (Almås, 2002).
Subsidies were reduced and prices cut, especially for grain, which in
turnmeant cheaper fodder for livestock farmers. Themaximum legal
size of animal production systems based on concentrated feed wasincreased markedly. Subsidies for typical rural production systems
such as those based on local fodder (grass) were changed to lesser
degree, but still underwent signiﬁcant changes. For example, from
1997 the buying and selling of milk quotas was permitted and reg-
ulations adjusted to stimulate cooperative milk production between
farmers. Investment grants for new farm-based rural production
were also introduced in the 1990s, together with environmental
regulations and a policy shift towards emphasising the multifunc-
tional outputs (biodiversity, cultural landscapes) of farming
(Bjørkhaug and Richards, 2008).
In the remainder of this sub-section we outline in more detail
legislative and economic instruments relevant for farmland use and
control.
4.1.1. Legislation
Three key pieces of legislation are responsible for agricultural
property relations in Norwaye the Allodial Act, the Concession Act,
and the Agricultural Act. In addition there is speciﬁc legislation on
spreading of manure that, while not legislated as an Act, constitutes
a legal requirement that has strong implications for land control.
4.1.1.1. The Allodial Act. The Allodial Act is an ancient law that
automatically provides family members the status of preferred
buyer in situations where agricultural properties are made avail-
able for sale (Gjerdåker, 2001; Lilleholt, 1998). While it is difﬁcult to
assess the impact of the legislation over informal family agree-
ments, in total, 59 percent of transactions of farmland are made
within the family (Statistics Norway, 2011c). However, to obtain
allodial right the property must have at least 2.5 ha agricultural
land. Hence, the percentage of family transfers must be expected to
be higher on properties with 2.5 ha agricultural land or more and
lower when it comes to smaller properties and single parcels
(Sevatdal and Sky, 2003). Overall, the impact of the Allodial Act
combined with a preference for family transference in Norway
(Flemsæter, 2009; Flemsæter et al., 2011) reduces the probability
that leasers purchase the farmland they rent and, in general,
maintains farmland within family ownership. However, the circle
of family members with allodial rights has been steadily declining
due to changes in the Allodial Act over the decades (Forbord, 2006;
Landbruks- og matdepartementet, 2011-2012; Odelsloven, 1974).
4.1.1.2. The Concession Act. Rather than controlling transfer within
the family, the Concession Act enables the state to control who is
able to acquire farm property and at what price (Konsesjonsloven,
2003; Lilleholt, 1998; Sevatdal and Sky, 2003).3 Two requirements
are of speciﬁc interest to changing land ownership. Firstly, there is a
general obligation of residency (Storstad et al., 2009) which pro-
vides the authorities with the ability to demand the buyer reside on
the farm property for a minimum of ﬁve years after take-over (a
rule also applicable to take-over by a family member). This reduces
the opportunity for farm expansion through land purchase, setting
an indirect limit to the number of farm properties that can be
owned by one person or a couple e although it does not prevent
family members from nominally taking over a farm. Secondly, the
Concession Act regulates the purchase of land by legal persons (e.g.
limited companies) by providing preference to potential purchasers
whose stated occupation is farming (Forbord, 2006). In practice,
this means that where land is taken over by a company at least one
person must be an active farmer.
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distinctively Norwegian law e there are some vestiges of allodial
(Udal) law in Scotland (Mackenzie, 2004) e and concession legis-
lation is rare, most countries, in contrast, have an Agricultural Act.
In Norway the objective of today’s law (adopted in 1995) is to
ensure that all land resources are used in the best way possible for
society and farmers, for example, through promoting rural settle-
ment, employment and agricultural development (Jordloven,
1995). Two aspects of the Agricultural Act are particularly rele-
vant to the issue of land control. Firstly, the Act places responsibility
on the owner of the land to ensure that it is being actively farmed
(“driveplikt”), either by farming it personally, or renting out the
land to an active farmer. To ensure the leasing of farmland is a
secure option for both leaser and owner,4 the law further stipulates
a minimum rental period of 10 years, that the land must be
maintained in good condition, and that the contract is formally
written rather than verbal.
Second, the Act stipulates the conditions for eventual partition
of farm property. In general, partition is not permitted but it may be
allowed by the agricultural authorities if it is deemed likely to lead
to social improvements such as “increased harmony between the
property structure and the holding structure” (Jordloven, 1995).
Consequently, in some cases farm owners have been permitted to
sell the agricultural land to an active farmer (in many cases the
leaser of the land), while retaining the rest of the farm property
(residential buildings, outbuildings, garden and a small piece of
agricultural land). In such cases three purposes in the Agricultural
Act can bemet at the same time: rural settlement, employment and
agricultural rationalisation. Such cases are thus far infrequent in
Norway, but proposed revisions to Norway’s agricultural policy
calls for this type of land restructuring to be more widely applied
(Landbruks- og matdepartementet, 2011-2012).
4.1.1.4. Legislation on spreading of manure. In addition to the Allo-
dial, Concession and Agricultural Acts one other legal requirement
has had strong implications for land control. In Norway all farms
with livestock production are obliged to either hold sufﬁcient land
for spreading animal manure or have an agreement for its removal/
disposal (Lovdata, 2002). Such an agreement has normally to be
written and last at least ﬁve years. As a result, where fodder is
purchased and manure removed for use elsewhere, livestock pro-
duction can be concentrated on relatively small farms. In this case
the scale of production tends to be dependent on the costs of
transporting fodder and manure rather than the size of the farm on
which the production is occurring. In general, however, as livestock
production is dominant in Norway, this rule provides an incentive
for expansion to provide both feed for the animals and a place for
the disposal of manure.
4.1.2. Economic instruments
While legal instruments have been created to inﬂuence farm-
land control, the purpose of economic instruments (e.g. subsidies)
is to inﬂuence production, income and certain structural variables
in agriculture (Landbruks- og matdepartementet, 2010, 2011-2012;
Statens landbruksforvaltning, 2012). In general, the aim is to
strengthen farm incomes, even out incomes between different
production types, farm sizes and regions, and contribute to envi-
ronmentally sound production. The farmer must have a certain
minimum production level and be registered in the business4 Some adjustments in the conditions for leasing of farmland have recently been
suggested (Landbruks- og matdepartementet, 2011-2012). Among other things it
has been suggested that the minimum leasing period should be reduced to ﬁve
years and special rules applied in cases of crop rotation.register (“Enhetsregisteret”). Beyond this, payments for cultivated
land (arable/grassland production) and livestock production differ
in design and so are described separately.
4.1.2.1. Arable/grassland production. All cultivated land in Norway
receives a subsidy per land unit consisting of two parts. The cultural
landscape support (“Kulturlandskapstilskuddet”) is provided as a
ﬁxed sum per land unit in all regions, while the agricultural land
support (“Arealtilskuddet”) is differentiated by type, size and
regional localisation of production. The aim of these instruments is
to maintain the area of cultivated land in Norway, contribute to
environmentally sound farming, and strengthen and even out farm
incomes. The structure of the land subsidies has changed over time.
Until 2004, maximumpayments for grasslandwere limited by area;
20 ha in 1992 and later and until 2004 40 ha (Landbruks- og
matdepartementet, 2010). From 2004 all grassland has been
eligible for area payments however payment levels have been
divided into two levels with the higher rate payable for the ﬁrst
20 ha up until 2009 and 25 ha from 2010.
Support for grain production has always been paid irrespective of
farmed area. In 1992 there were three payment thresholds, with a
very small rate for production of up to 4 ha, a larger rate for farmers
producing between 4 and 40 ha of grain, and a lower rate above
40 ha. In 2000 the lowest interval was merged with the second
interval. For a brief period from 2002 to 2005 a single rate was paid,
but in 2006 the two-interval model was re-introduced with a
moderately lower rate (5e10% lower) for production of above 80 ha.
Although area payments for production are differentiated by
farm size, the payment of additional cultural landscape support
removes much of the differentiation between the size-based pay-
ment categories. For example, in Zone1 in 2012, the best agricultural
regions in the South-East of Norway, the total support for grassland
up to 25 hawas NOK2810 ($US 505) per ha andNOK2560 ($US 460)
for land above 25 ha. For grain the corresponding ﬁgures were NOK
3140 ($US 565) and NOK 2930 ($US 527) below and above 80 ha
respectively (Statens landbruksforvaltning, 2012). The consequence
of the changes in subsidy structure for cultivated land has been that
it has become more proﬁtable for farm holdings to increase their
volumeof arable/grassland productione inparticular grain, but also
grass and especially, since 2002, in the best agricultural regions.
4.1.2.2. Animal production. In contrast to grain/grass production
there are subsidy limits in place for all forms of animal production
(Statens landbruksforvaltning, 2012). For example, in 2012 farmers
were limited to subsidies for 50 cows, 250 other cattle, 300 breeding
sheep, 35 breeding pigs, 1400 slaughtered pigs and 5000 hens. Each
class has between 2 and 4 herd size payment thresholds with the
exceptions of pigs where there are no thresholds, and poultry, which
does not receive any subsidy. However, there are size restrictions per
holding for concentrated-feed-based animal production through
concession limits (Lovdata, 2004). These limits were raised signiﬁ-
cantly in 2004, for example, to a maximum size of 120,000 slaugh-
tered chickens per year and 2100 slaughtered pigs per year. Because
only concentrated feed is required, expansion of such production can
be conducted independently of on-farm fodder production, be it on
owned or rented land. However, agreement with another farmer
concerning land for spreading manure is necessary (see above).
4.2. Change in farmland control in Norway
The number of farms (holdings) in different farmland control
categories has been surveyed at regular intervals in Norway
through Census of Agriculture, carried out approximately every
tenth year (Statistics Norway, 2011b). Table 1 shows the number
and proportions in the four categories (“wholly owned”, “mainly
Table 1
Holdings by type of farmland control and farm properties 1959e2010, Norway.
Holdings Number of farm
properties
Wholly owneda Mainly owned Mainly rented Wholly rented Total
1959
Share
171,572
87%
10,039
5%
2644
1%
14,060
7%
198,315
101%
Ca. 210,000
1979
Share
86,401
69%
22,353
18%
6428
5%
10,120
8%
125,302
100%
191,707
1999
Share
31,994
45%
23,455
33%
9543
13%
5748
8%
70,740
99%
200,900b
2010
Share
16,226
35%
16,148
35%
10,508
23%
3742
8%
46,624
101%
185,098
a Farmland control categories deﬁned as follows: Wholly owned:<0.1% rented farmland; Mainly owned: 0.1e50% rented farmland; Mainly rented: 50.1e99.9% rented
farmland; Wholly rented:>99.9% rented farmland.
b Figure for the year 2000 (Source: Statistics Norway).
Table 2
Key characteristics of farms on which interviews were made.
Region Farm# Ownership
situation
Agricultural
land owned, ha
Total land
owned, ha
Production(s) on
the farm
Part-time or
full-time?
Annual person
years
A ¼ Østfold 1 Mainly owneda 20e29 35 Grain
Sheep
Part-time 0.5e0.9
A 2 Mainly owneda 30e49 65 Milk
Chicken
Full-time >2.5
A 3 Mainly renteda 10e19 30 Grain
Egg
Full-time 1.5e1.9
A 4 Rented out 30e49 89 (Grain) e e
A 5 Mainly rented 30e49 63 Grain
Pig
Full-time >2.5
A 6 Rented out 20e29 53 (Grain) e e
B ¼ Rogaland 1 Rented outa 10e19 20 (Sheep) e e
B 2 Wholly owneda 5e9 7 Egg Part-time 1.0e1.4
B 3 Mainly owned >50 85 Milk
Sheep
Full-time >2.5
B 4 Mainly owneda 30e49 77 Milk Full-time >2.5
B 5 Wholly owned 10e19 38 Cattle
Christmas trees
Part-time 1.0e1.4
B 6 Mainly owneda 10e19 20 Milk
Pig
Full-time 2.0e2.4
C ¼ Sogn og Fjordane 1 Mainly rented 5e9 60 Milk Full-time 1.5e1.9
C 2 Rented outa 5e9 12 (Milk) e e
C 3 Mainly owned 10e19 103 Milk Full-time 2.0e2.4
C 4 Rented out 0e4 >4 (Cattle) e e
C 5 Mainly owned 5e9 33 Sheep Part-time 0.5e0.9
C 6 Mainly owned 5e9 30 Apples
Raspberries Milk
Sheep
Full-time 2.0e2.4
a Interview with couple.
5 These ﬁgures were generated on request through calculations on the Census
2010 data carried out March 2012 by Anne Snellingen Bye, Statistics Norway.
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below table) at four points in time between 1959 and 2010. In
addition, data on the total number of farm properties in existence is
included (Statistics Norway, 2011a).
Table 1 illustrates how the proportion of wholly owned holdings
has steadily decreased from 87 percent in 1959 to 35 percent in
2010 while the proportion of wholly rented holdings has been
stable and low throughout the period. At the same time there has
been a notable increase in partly rented farm holdings (the two
middle categories) from a six percent share in 1959 to a 58 percent
share in 2010. The only category to have experienced constant
numerical and proportional growth over the time period has been
the “mainly rented” category (50.1e99.9% rented), see Fig. 2.
Fromalmostnone in1959, theproportionof farms in this category
has increased exponentially so that, by 2010, 23 percent of farms in
Norwayarenowmainly rented.While it isnotpossible fromavailable
data to ascertain how this change in composition has occurred (i.e.
movementbetweencategories) it appears likely that this is a result of
owner occupied farms renting increasingly large amounts of farm-
land in order to expand the business. This suggests, as Evans (2009)
observed, that renting land is seen as an opportunity for “achievingagrarian accumulation through the ‘conventional’ post-war pro-
ductivist mechanisms of efﬁciency and economies of scale.”
This is supported by statistics indicating that in 2010 farmers in
the “mainly rented” category had the largest total farm sizes
(32.8 ha) and, at the same time, the highest average number of
livestock, for example: dairy cows, breeding sheep, and pigs
(Statistics Norway, 2011b).5 Consequently, to overcome the legal
and economic barriers to expansion detailed above, farmers appear
to be increasingly turning to renting land over the difﬁcult task of a
transfer of ownership.
We contend that this increase in “accumulation renting” is
fuelled by a number of coinciding factors. First, owing to the insta-
bility of agricultural incomes and the contractual nature of formal
rental arrangements (see above), expansion through renting is
widely seen as leading to increased risk (Daskalopoulou and Petrou,
2002; Iraizoz et al., 2007). In Norway, however, high production
subsidies substantially reduce the risk to farmers of entering into
Fig. 2. Share of Norwegian farms in “mainly rented” category 1959e2010.
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option. This security is increased by the 10 yearminimumperiod for
renting contracts as required under the Agricultural Act. Further, the
increase in the past decade of mainly rented farms is likely to have
been encouraged by a signiﬁcantly lower difference in subsidy rates
between small and large areas, both for grain (from 2002) and
grassland (from 2004) (see Section 4.1.2).
Other factors may also have contributed. For example, the
continuation of restrictions on transfer of land ownership via the
Allodial Act and the general prohibition of partitioning of agricul-
tural properties through the Agricultural Act (Forbord, 2006) are
likely to have decreased the opportunity for expansion through
acquisition of ownership and rendered renting land a better option
for expansion minded farmers. The impact of these changes can
also be seen in the statistics on general structural changes in Nor-
wegian agriculture (Statistics Norway, 2011b). These illustrate that
between 1999 and 2010 the number of holdings with grain and
oilseed crops under 40 ha has almost halved (from 20,446 holdings
in 1999 to 11,577 holdings in 2010) while the number of such
holdings with 40 ha or more increased by 33 percent (from 1462 to
1956 holdings) (Statistics Norway, 2012).
The change in farmland control has been parallelled by a steady
decrease in the number of holdings, from 198,315 in 1959 to 46,624
in 2010 e while the total number of farm properties has remained
relatively stable. A consequence of this is a rise in the number of
farmers in the ﬁfth category of “non-farming owners” who are not
actively farming the land but rather rent farmland to
others.6 However, the non-farming owners have the legal re-
sponsibility under the Agricultural Act to maintain farmland in
good condition (Jordloven, 1995) and may engage in other types of
activity based on resources on the farm such as farm tourism or
renting out farm buildings. The growth in “non-farming owners”
may reﬂect the phenomena of socially related land control (i.e.
maintaining the land for intrinsic reasons such as long historical
family association), however, it may also reﬂect the difﬁculties of
land transference in Norway. Regardless, this group represents an
increasingly important section of Norway’s rural community.4.3. Ownership and renting from the farmer perspective
While analysis of policy and statistics can inform us of structural
changes at amacro level, such analysis alone is unlikely to illuminate6 A similar increase in non-farming owners has been observed for neighbouring
Sweden (Djurfeldt and Gooch, 2002).change and motivations for change at the farm level. To extend the
investigation, therefore, we also interviewed farmers in three re-
gions of Norway to ascertain what other processes might be
responsible for changes in land ownership structures. Table 2 pro-
vides anoverviewof the18 farmswhere interviewswere conducted.
4.3.1. Drivers of the increase in partly rented farms
As with elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Munton, 2009; Ilbery et al.,
2010) a key driver of expansion for interviewed farmers was the
need to develop economies of scale in order to support the in-
vestments required in machinery for modern agriculture. For
example, farmer A3 observes: “The more hectares you have, the
cheaper the equipment becomes.” The international nature of farm
machinery production and increasing farm sizes outside of Norway
means that tractors, harvesters and so on are increasingly unsuited
to Norway’s small farm businesses (Kvalvik et al., 2011). On the
other hand, the development of labour markets outside of agri-
culture (Zimmermann et al., 2009) has led to a scarcity of labour
and the necessity of larger machinery.
Among our interviewees there were few examples of renting
land for the main purpose of manure dispersal. The interviewed
farmers in Trøgstad with livestock production on concentrated
feed (A2, A3 and A5) were all active grain growers and were thus
able to distribute the manure as fertiliser on their own farms.
Farmer B6 in Time had grassland (for milk production) on which
to disperse manure from his pig production. Interestingly, the
only specialised producer of livestock on concentrated feed
(Farmer B2 e egg producer) had little farmland and no rented
land, but had an agreement with another farmer to disperse the
manure.
Relative to the purchase of land the renting of land is often seen
as a good solution for both those who rent and those renting out.
This is for a number of reasons. First, the cost of renting land is
relatively cheap compared to purchasing it. Farmer A5 from an
intensive agricultural area observes: “Some farmers say that not
owning your farmland is a problem. I haven’t felt it that way. I
mean, it would have been very expensive to buy that land.” In other
less intensive farming regions the situation may be even better for
renting in part as a result of the requirements to maintain the land
in farmed condition combined with an increasing lack of potential
tenant farmers. For example, Farmer C5 observes: “Those who rent
out have so much interest in the farmland being rented out that
they are unlikely to claim much rent. They are just glad of having
someone to farm the land.”
That land rental agreements are mutually beneﬁcial can be seen
in the positive relationships between renters and land owners e as
was noted by both the renters (e.g. farmers B6 and A5) and land
owner (A6). This may be attributable to the small scale, local and
personal nature of the renting arrangements in Norway.
The recent rapid decline in the number of active farms may also
be contributing to the rise in rental properties because of the
impact it has on the presence of potential successors on the agri-
cultural properties that remain. This acts both as incentive to rent
out (rather than sell) land, and as an incentive not to purchase land.
For example, farmer C3 observes that he is not looking to purchase
land because his 22 year old son is now working off the farm and
there is some uncertainty as to whether he will return:
I could be interested in buying farmland, but thenmy son is now
22, and he would have to be involved in the decision. It may be
that he has too good a job (outside the farm) to be interested in
taking over the farm. I don’t know.
Thus, while succession remains uncertain the economic ratio-
nality of purchasing farmland appears to be limited e particularly
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be very tough. So, we talk about e you have to pay, up to NOK
100,000 ($US 18,000) per hectare now to buy farmland” (also
commented on by B4). On the other hand, the small scale of Nor-
wegian farms provides an incentive to expand when a successor is
available. For example, farmer A5 observes:
I am 58, the rest of my career is short, but the motivation for
what we are doing here.Most of what we did the last 10 years,
would not have happened if no one had been interested in
taking over the farm. Then we would have slowed down
considerably.
This is not a situation unique to Norway. Numerous studies
have suggested that having a successor to take over the farm plays
a key role in farm strategic decision-making by increasing the
planning horizon for farm investments, see e.g. (Lambert et al.,
2007; Marsden et al., 1989; Ward and Lowe, 1994), as well as
creating periods of major business restructuring such as the
intensiﬁcation of production or expansion of the farm (Ellis et al.,
1999; Smithers and Johnson, 2004). The prospect of succession
can also act as a disincentive for selling the farm. For example,
farmer B1 e a former milk producer currently renting out the
farmland (and the milk quota) to a milk producer e observes how
he is holding the farm together with the intention of providing his
children with the opportunity for re-entering milk production. He
notes:
We are waiting a bit [to sell the milk quota] because we have
two grown-up boys . I doubt they will ever start milk pro-
duction again but they will be given the opportunity if they
want. . to sell or divide the farmland is not an option.
Prospective succession driven by the recency of the move away
from agriculture in Norway is thus contributing to a reluctance to
sell farms, a reluctance of farmers to purchase land, and a need to
expand farm sizes to attract successors. At the same time, once the
successor has left the farm and the farmer has retired, requirements
to keep agricultural land in active use under the Agricultural Act
mean land effectively must be rented out if it is not sold.
When young people are trying to establish a living based on
farming, the lack of availability of a farm property for purchasemay
hinder future engagement with agriculture. Farmer A1, for
example, explains why it is undesirable to engage in agriculture on
a wholly rented farm:
Being in my 30s and then beginning a ten year renting contract
not knowing whether you can buy e that is entirely uninter-
esting . So having ownership is very important.
This may explain why, in the past, only a small proportion of
active farms in Norway have been wholly rented. If the increase in
rented land experienced over the past 50 years continues without
land becomingmore readily available for purchase, this observation
will become increasingly relevant as it suggests the development of
a predominantly “rented” farm market in Norway may discourage
younger farmers from entering the profession. However, currently,
owning a farm with the option of renting additional farmland ap-
pears to be the main means for younger farmers to enter the pro-
fession at a commercial level.77 As an indication in our interview sample the average age was 53 years. The age
was lowest in the “mainly rented” category (44 years) and highest in the “rented
out” category (58 years).4.3.2. Fragmentation of farmland, familial obligations and soil
maintenance
Fragmentation of land emerged as a key issue for farmers in the
interviews. The rapid growth of “mainly rented farms” in a land-
scape occupied by multiple small farm properties and with legis-
lative controls limiting land transfer has led to a major issue with
fragmentation of land e one that is now affecting the operation of
farms. For example, respondent A5 observed of farmers in his lo-
cality that:
Many operate land in many different areas. we spend most of
our farming time in the spring on public roads. and that is not
a positive development. Many small areas of land and tens of
kilometres between them. That’s what we have to look after
through the season. its expensive and inefﬁcient.
This issue has been noted in other countries with large agri-
cultural populations and relatively small farm sizes, for example
Greece (Daskalopoulou and Petrou, 2002). Despite the problems
and inefﬁciencies involved in farming small fragmented land
packages, many farmers that expand by renting are forced to rent
multiple small units e although, interestingly, the choice of land
packages to rent is not always made on a purely economic basis. For
example, farmer A3 notes that while most of his rented ﬁelds are
within 2e3 km of the farm:
I have one farm that is, yea, 10 km away. But that has to do with
family relations; we do that to be kind. it is a bit far to go with
our equipment. It is getting awkward.
Others also note distant family connections as a motivation for
taking on dispersed land packages, for example, farmer A2
observes:
I lease two smaller farms up in the forest e old smallholding
(“husmannsplass”) farms. Its background is that my great
grandfather and grandfather and father had a farmhand over
three generations. He lived up in the forest, and wewere offered
the lease as he gradually retired from farming.
Farmer A5 similarly observes that he rents a farm in another
municipality that “family on my mother’s side leased to me”
because they felt a personal obligation, even though “For us, driving
to and operating nine hectares is actually not very proﬁtable.” This
leasing on the basis of historical family connections is an interesting
development. It indicates Norway’s rapidly declining population of
active farmers, prioritisation of social obligations (also see
Flemsæter (2009) and Flemsæter et al. (2011)) and requirement for
land to be actively farmed are together contributing to farm
structural development e with the returns from the structural
change largely social rather than economic (e.g. see Sutherland and
Burton, 2011).
In another case, informant A6 observed that it is the type of
farmer renting land in combination with the fragmented nature of
Norwegian farmland that is important. She notes that the “rental
entrepreneurial” type of farmer tends to damage rental properties
because the long transport distances, fragmented land parcels and
size of the farm combine, leave the entrepreneur using “horribly
large and heavy” machinery while, at the same time, being unable
to work the farms under optimal conditions. This, she suggests,
leads to soil damage and limits the extent to which the farmer pays
attention to the land before, during and after the growing season. In
this case, the way the legislative system regulates land transfer
arrangements combined with forces for more rational agriculture
in Norway are clearly contributing to the problem.
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5.1. Changes in farmland control in Norway
The rapid increase in the proportion of ‘mainly rented’ farms
observed above suggests that Norway is moving away from a
century-old pattern of small, owner occupied farms towards amore
conventional, if fragmented, pattern of agricultural development.
This change may be attributed, to a large part, to the historical
development of agriculture and legislative/economic controls. In
particular, we contend that high levels of subsidisation and the
security of the subsidy regime (as emphasised by the ‘social con-
tract’ between the government and rural population) have meant
that agriculture in Norway has become highly adapted to the leg-
islative and economic environment, such that any signiﬁcant
change in the subsidy system (for example, a smaller differential
between rate levels or an increase in thresholds) or legislation can
lead to marked structural adjustment.
Just such a change occurred with the reforms of the incentive
systems in the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, the introduction of
payments (although at a lower level) for grassland above the 20e
25 ha threshold and the removal of the threshold for grain subsidies
combined with an increase in the number of animals claimable for,
appear to have had a signiﬁcant impact on farm structures inNorway.
Structural adjustment to changes in subsidy regimes is not unusual.
For example, Gaspar et al. (2008) observe that the CAP reforms of
1992 and 2000 had a marked effect on the dehesa8 sheep farming
systems in Spain as farmers intensiﬁed production to maximise
subsidy returns, while Morgan-Davies et al. (2012) noted the impact
of the removal of production subsidies on the potential for dramatic
extensiﬁcation and even land abandonment in Scotland. However,
what is perhaps unique is how this has combined with three other
factors to inﬂuence changing patterns of land control.
The ﬁrst is the nature of legislative controls in Norwegian
agriculture. As we note above, the Allodial Act reduces the proba-
bility that land is transferred away from those with allodial rights
through a transfer of ownership.9 While this has been tempered to
some extent by the decline in the number of family members with
allodial rights, the overall impact is to increase the likelihood that
farmers control land through rental agreements rather than
ownership. Regulations under the Agricultural Act requiring
owners to maintain the land in good condition also act as a major
incentive for renting out land, as does the general prohibition
against partitioning of farm properties in the Agricultural Act
(“delingsforbudet”) e even though in the 2000s this regulation has
been amended to allow for more sales of individual ﬁelds and parts
of farmland.
Second, Norway’s long history of multiple small farm ownership
has established numerous social obligations between farm families
as has been illustrated by the interview data. A number of farmers
experience a feeling of obligation tomanage land on the basis of old
family connections e regardless of distance from the farm or
whether it is convenient from a business perspective. Non-farming
owners also have strong connections to their farm properties. In a
study in 1998 in the county of Møre og Romsdal among owners not
living on the property, strong personal connections to the property
and the local community and awish to wait for the next generation
to make decisions about take-over were the most important8 Dehesa is a type of agroforestry and cultural landscape systemwhere grazing is
combined with various non-timber forest productions.
9 The number of farm properties with allodial rights was estimated to 130,000e
140,000 in 2003 (Landbruksdepartementet, 2003), that is, around 70 percent of the
properties.reasons for not selling the property (Fylkesmannen i Møre og
Romsdal, 1998; Landbruksdepartementet, 2003). Allodial right
was the thirdmost important reason for not selling. Nevertheless, a
substantial share (41 percent) of all transfers of farmland properties
in Norway is to persons outside the family (Statistics Norway,
2011c).10
Third, even an ambitious agricultural policy with instruments
aiming at compensating and/or encouraging structural differences
in farming and regulating farm property transfers does not prevent
the inﬂuence of what can be termed techno-economic factors. Such
factors include developments in farming technology, changing
markets and demand for farm products and income opportunities
in other economic sectors. In fact, the statistics presented in Section
4.2. illustrate that even in periods with rather generous subsidies
and detailed regulation (such as in Norway in the 1970s) the
pattern in development of farmland control types was not much
different from that in previous and later periods. Consequently,
even though we have found indications of a more extensive shift in
farmland control categories from the late 1990s and onwards, the
picture for the whole period (1959e2010) suggests “stable change”
rather than sudden and rapid shifts.
5.2. Implications
In terms of the future structure of Norwegian agriculture an
important observation to make is that the current exponential in-
crease in the proportion of “mainly rented” farms is clearly un-
sustainable. However, judging from the rate of increase and
historical trends, we do not expect the distribution to stabilize at its
current point but rather the trend for an increasing proportion of
“mainly rented” farms to continue e particularly if there is no shift
in legislative controls and the subsidy structure remains. Legislative
changes making it easier to purchase land could result in a shift
back to ownership and, further, we may see a rationalisation of
fragmented land use patterns as the impact of historical family
obligations on renting decisions declines due to continued de-
mographic change. Furthermore, in principal the state could,
togetherwith local farmers and authorities, play a role in regulating
fragmented farmland. To what extent this will happen depend on
political will and farmers’ organisations.
What problems are likely to result from these structural changes
in land control? One often noted problem with rental land is the
effect of a limited time horizon on environmental management and
stewardship. Globally, studies have indicated that rented land is
managed poorly (for example, in terms of soil conservation, cultural
heritage and biodiversity) compared to privately own land (Fraser,
2004; Lobley and Potter, 2004). Stokstad (2010) also notes that land
rented out in Northern Norway was more likely to end up partly
abandoned than owned lande although Dramstad and Sang (2010)
found no evidence of a similar connection between tenanting and
abandonment in southern Norway. This geographical difference
within a country has also been found in the UK where Ward et al.
(1990) suggest that the custodianship of rented land depends
largely on the “far from uniform” approaches of tenants and land-
lords and is tied to both the types of policy support and the his-
tories of the farms themselves.
Our study has shown that land fragmentation can create difﬁ-
culties for both individual farms and farming communities. As
noted in the qualitative interviews, expanding farms in Norway
sometimes rent distant land packages, and not only for economic10 These statistics include properties with at least 0.5 ha agricultural land and/or
2.5 ha productive forest and can be parcels as well as “whole” properties with
buildings and courtyard.
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likely to present a major problem for the rationalisation of Nor-
wegian agriculture e particularly given that the legal protection
under the Allodial Act makes transfer of ownership outside the
family difﬁcult and the limited “good land” for farming is often
geographically scattered. Difﬁculties may also emerge elsewhere.
For example, increasing structural land fragmentation is likely to
make cohesive landscape management increasingly difﬁcult
(Macfarlane, 2000), can lead to a loss of farmed land area (van Dijk,
2003), and makes the establishment of cooperative machinery
purchase more difﬁcult as the economics of common acquisition of
small machines is questionable (Thenail, 2002).
5.3. A model
As a ﬁnal stage in the discussionwe propose a general model for
looking at changes in farmland control (Fig. 3).
The model proposes three broad groups of factors affecting
farmland control. First, techno-economic factors have overall
contributed to both the need (due to increasingly large machinery
and changing rural populations) and opportunity (to grow the
business) for each farmer to manage an increasingly large area of
farmland. Developments in the food markets and public expecta-
tions of reduced food prices have also generally pushed in this di-
rection. Changes in other economic sectors leading to declining
rural populations, a lower chance of succession and a lower
attractiveness of agricultural employment also fall into this cate-
gory. Second, social norms play a role. In our case social mechanisms
and expectations related to farm properties and farmland are of
special interest. Such social norms involve among things moral
obligations to the land (e.g. Setten, 2004), the expectation of
intergenerational continuity on a farm (e.g. Rossier, 2005) and so-
cial obligations to neighbouring farmers (e.g. Sutherland and
Burton, 2011). By and large such social norms have led to holding
back transfer of farm properties and upheld the existing farm
property structure. Third, as discussed above, agricultural policy
exerts an important inﬂuence. In the Norwegian context legal in-
struments have the effect of limiting the number of property
transfers, whereas economic instruments have in general allowed
farmers to remain proﬁtable at what might elsewhere be consid-
ered uneconomically viable farm sizes (although changes in the
design of subsidies in the 2000s have reduced the incitement to
“stay small”). A combined effect of the three factors can explain the
change in the pattern of farmland control in Norway over the last
ﬁfty years.Fig. 3. Factors affecting farmland control.6. Conclusion
Our study has illustrated, based on three key sources of data,
how farmland control in Norway has shifted within a period of 50
years from a situation where 87% of farms were owner occupied to
one where the renting of land is increasingly the dominant
arrangement. Compared to the complicated process of purchasing
land with its legal requirements, family involvement and high
economic costs, renting farmland to many seems like a far more
attractive option (also see Dramstad and Sang (2010)). In addition,
for those farmers stuck in a situation where they are required by
law to have the land farmed but the rural population is declining,
succession is uncertain and social and moral connections to the
land and local community are still strong, renting out land offers
perhaps the only alternative to abandonment e if not of the land
itself, at least to the hope of a farming future.
In this study the key changes as illustrated in themodel (Section
5.3) were in the policy and techno-economic areas with the social
norms playing a role in inﬂuencing land fragmentation patterns
and a tendency to hold onto land for succession and its social value.
However, this situation is unlikely to last. Norwegian politics (as
elsewhere) has witnessed a rise in support for neoliberal gover-
nance with substantial gains made recently by free-market ori-
ented political parties. These parties advocate the ‘freeing of the
farmers’ e opening up Norwegian agriculture to international
competition by removing trade barriers and subsidies. Likewise,
the social factors will change over time as increasing numbers of
farmers accept that succession is unlikely and the social ties (and
obligations) between farmers in local communities disappear along
with the rural population decline. What the ﬁnal outcome is likely
to be is unknown. However, as these likely future changes point to
both an increasing need for economies of scale and a reduction in
social norms maintaining the existing system, it seems likely that
the move towards rental forms of land control combined with the
abandonment of smaller farms in remoter areas, e.g. Northern
Norway (Stokstad, 2010), will continue in the foreseeable future.Acknowledgements
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